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Abstract
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has developed a novel
framework for assessing and communicating uncertainty in the findings pub-
lished in their periodic assessment reports. But how should these uncer-
tainty assessments inform decisions? We take a formal decision-making
perspective to investigate how scientific input formulated in the IPCC’s
novel framework might inform decisions in a principled way through a nor-
mative decision model.
1 Introduction
Assessment Reports produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) periodically summarize the present state of knowledge about climate
change, its impacts, and the prospects for mitigation and adaptation. More than
800 lead authors and review editors (and an even greater number of subsidiary
authors and reviewers) contributed to the fifth and most recent report, which
comprises a tome from each of three working groups, plus the condensed techni-
cal summaries, approachable summaries for policymakers, and a comprehensive
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synthesis report. There is no new research in an IPCC report; the aim is rather
to comprehensively assess existing research and report on the state of scientific
knowledge. It is an unusually generous allotment of scientific resources to sum-
mary, review, consensus-building and communication, reflecting the pressing need
for authoritative scientific findings to inform policy-making in an atmosphere of
skepticism and powerful status-quo interests.
Scientific knowledge comes in degrees of uncertainty, and the IPCC has de-
veloped an innovative approach to characterizing and communicating this uncer-
tainty. Their primary tools are probability and a qualitative notion of confidence.
In the reports’ most carefully-framed findings, the two metrics are used together,
with confidence assessments qualifying statements of probability. The question we
examine here is how such findings might be incorporated into a normative decision
framework. While the IPCC’s treatment of uncertainties has been discussed ex-
tensively in the scientific literature and in a major external review (Shapiro et al.,
2010), our question has not yet been addressed.
By exploring how scientific input in this novel format might systematically
inform rational decisions, we hope ultimately to improve climate change decision-
making and to make IPCC findings more useful to consumers of the reports. As
will emerge below, the immediate lessons of this paper concern how the decision-
theoretic perspective can help shape the IPCC’s uncertainty framework itself, and
how that framework is used by IPCC authors. One broader theoretical aim is to
learn from the IPCC’s experience with uncertainty assessment to better facilitate
evidence-based policy making more generally.
We begin by explaining the IPCC’s approach to uncertainty in greater detail.
We then survey recent work in decision theory that makes room for second-order
uncertainty of (at least roughly) the kind conveyed by IPCC confidence assess-
ments when those assessments qualify probabilities. The details of IPCC practice,
together with general features of the policy decision context, point to a family of
decision models that is for our purposes the most promising (Hill, 2013). We show
how to map IPCC-style findings onto these models, and, based on the resulting
picture of how such findings inform decisions, we draw some lessons about the way
the IPCC uncertainty framework is currently being used.
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2 Uncertainty in IPCC Reports
The fifth and most recent assessment report (AR5) affirms unequivocally that the
earth’s climate system is warming and leaves little room for doubt that human
activities are largely to blame.1 Yet climate change researchers continue to wrestle
with deep and persistent uncertainties regarding many of the specifics, such as the
pace of change in coming decades, the extent and distribution of impacts, or the
prospect of passing potentially calamitous “tipping points.” Further research can,
to a degree, reduce some of this uncertainty, but meanwhile it must be character-
ized, conveyed, and acted upon. Communication of uncertainty by IPCC authors
is informed by an evolving set of guidance notes that share best practices and
promote consistency across chapters and working groups (Moss and Schneider,
2000; Manning, 2005; Mastrandrea et al., 2010). These documents also anchor
a growing, interdisciplinary literature devoted to the treatment of uncertainties
within IPCC reports (Adler and Hadorn, 2014; Yohe and Oppenheimer, 2011).
One conspicuous feature of IPCC practice is the use of confidence assessments
to convey a qualitative judgement about the level of evidence and scientific under-
standing that backs up a given finding. Naturally, this varies from one finding to
the next. And it is, intuitively, important information for policymakers. The for-
mat for expressing confidence has changed subtly from one IPCC cycle to the next,
in part responding to critical review (Shapiro et al., 2010). Likewise for the de
facto implementation within each working group (Mastrandrea and Mach, 2011).
In AR5, confidence assessments are plentiful across all three working groups, from
the exhaustive, unabridged reports through all of the summary and synthesis.
The current guidance offers five qualifiers for expressing confidence: very low, low,
medium, high, and very high. To pick the right one, an author team appraises two
aspects of the relevant body of evidence, (roughly): how much evidence there is
(considering quantity, quality and variety), and how well the different sources of
evidence agree. The more evidence, and the more agreement, the more confidence
(Mastrandrea et al., 2010).
The second approved uncertainty metric is probability.2 And by far the most
1“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.” (IPCC, 2013, 2) “It is extremely likely
that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th
century.” (IPCC, 2013, 15)
2The IPCC uses the term “likelihood,” though one should not read into this the technical
meaning from statistics. We will use the more neutral term “probability.”
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common mode of presenting probabilities in AR5 is through words chosen from
a preset menu of calibrated language, where, for example, likely has an official
translation of “66-100% chance,” virtually certain means “99-100% chance,” and
more likely than not means “>50% chance.” There are ten phrases on the menu,
each indicating a different probability interval. (Precise probability density func-
tions are also sanctioned where there is sufficient evidence, though authors rarely
exercise this option; percentiles from cumulative density functions are somewhat
more common.)
Different author teams make somewhat different choices as they adapt the
common framework given by the two uncertainty metrics to the particulars of
their subject area. One way that authors have used the metrics is in combination:
where the finding that is qualified by a confidence assessment is itself a probabilistic
statement. In this case confidence is pushed into second position in a now two-
stage characterization of overall uncertainty:
In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983–2012 was likely the warmest 30-year
period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence).
Multiple lines of evidence provide high confidence that an [Equilibrium
Climate Sensitivity] value less than 1◦C is extremely unlikely.
Many, though not all, IPCC findings satisfy this format. Plenty of confidence
assessments do something other than modify a probability claim, such as when
an author team expresses confidence in an observational trend, or gives a blan-
ket appraisal of projections from a given modeling approach. All probabilities,
however, should be read as confidence-qualified. Sometimes the confidence level
is not written out explicitly, but the guidance note instructs that “a finding that
includes a probabilistic measure of uncertainty does not require explicit mention
of the level of confidence associated with that finding if the level of confidence is
‘high’ or ‘very high’ ” (Mastrandrea et al., 2010, 3), meaning that readers should
take unaccompanied probabilities to enjoy high or very high confidence.3 Findings
reported in the form of the quotations above will be our focus here.
3The summaries for policymakers of working groups two and three introduce additional con-
ventions for communicating confidence without excessive parenthetical clutter: “Within para-
graphs of this summary, the confidence, evidence, and agreement terms given for a bold key
finding apply to subsequent statements in the paragraph, unless additional terms are provided.”
(IPCC, 2014a, 6; IPCC, 2014b, 4).
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3 Decision, Imprecision and Confidence
The action which follows upon an opinion depends as much upon the
amount of confidence in that opinion as it does upon the favorableness
of the opinion itself.—Frank Knight (1921, 227)
Like any assessment that reflects a state of knowledge (or belief), the judge-
ments of the IPCC can play two sorts of roles. On the one hand, they can rep-
resent the salient features of the world and our uncertainty about them; on the
other hand, they can guide behavior, or policy. Any representation of uncertainty
can be evaluated by its capacity to fulfill each of these roles. Does it capture our
state of knowledge and uncertainty properly? Does it integrate into a reasonable
account of decision? While the IPCC uncertainty framework has been developed
mainly with the former role in mind—and we shall assume for the purposes of this
paper that it fairs sufficiently well on this front—the focus here is on the latter
role. Are there existing normatively reasonable accounts of decision making into
which the IPCC representation of uncertainty provides relevant input, and what
are the consequences of bringing the two together?
At first pass, the IPCC’s uncertainty framework seems far-removed from mod-
els developed by decision theorists. The standard approach in decision theory,
often termed Bayesianism, prescribes maximization of expected utility relative to
the probabilities of the possible states of the world and the utilities of the possible
consequences of available actions. Naturally, in order to apply this theory, the
decision maker must be equipped with all decision-relevant probabilities. (Utili-
ties are also required, but as they reflect judgements of value or desirability, they
should come not from scientific reports but from society or the policy maker.)
What the IPCC delivers, however, are not precise probabilities but probability
ranges, qualified by confidence judgements. The former are too imprecise to be
used in the standard expected utility model; the latter have no role at all to play in
that model. IPCC findings thus sit uncomfortably with standard decision theory.
This mismatch need not reflect badly on the IPCC framework. On the con-
trary, several researchers (Bradley, 2009; Joyce, 2011; Gilboa et al., 2009, 2012;
Gilboa and Marinacci, 2011) have suggested that the standard insistence on a
single precise probability function leads to an inadequate representation of uncer-
tainty, and may moreover have unintuitive, and indeed normatively undesirable
consequences for decision. This has sparked attempts within both philosophy and
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economics to develop alternative theories of rational decision making, and this
literature provides the natural starting point for our attempt to accommodate
scientific findings expressed using the IPCC uncertainty framework.
3.1 Imprecise Probability
The use of probability ranges by the IPCC invokes what is sometimes known in
the theoretical literature as imprecise probability. Notions of imprecise probabil-
ity have a long history going back to at least Keynes, Koopman and Borel (see
Walley, 1991). Central to much of this literature is the use of sets of probability
functions to represent the epistemic state of an agent who cannot determine a
unique probability for all events of interest to her.4 Informally we can think of
this set as containing those probability functions that the decision maker regards
as permissible to adopt given the information she holds.
To motivate the idea, recall Popper’s paradox of ideal evidence (1974, 407–
8), which compares two situations in which a coin is tossed and we are asked to
provide a probability for it landing heads. In the first, we know nothing about the
coin; in the second, we have already observed 1000 tosses and seen that it lands
heads roughly half the time. Our epistemic state in the second case can reasonably
be represented by a precise probability of one-half for the outcome of heads on
the next toss. By contrast, the thought goes, the evidence available in the first
case can justify only a set of probabilities—perhaps, indeed, the set of all possible
probabilities. To adhere to a single probability, even the “neutral” probability of
one-half, would require a leap of faith from the decision maker, and it is hard to
see why she should be forced to make this leap. Pragmatic considerations too
suggest allowing imprecise probabilities. Given a choice between betting in the
first case or in the second, it seems natural that one might prefer betting in the
second—but a Bayesian decision maker cannot have such preferences.5
Bayesian decision theory is unimpressed by these considerations. No matter
the scarcity of the decision maker’s information, she must pick a single proba-
bility function as a reflection of her beliefs, to be used in all decisions. This
is often called her “subjective” probability, and particularly in cases where the
4The use of sets of probability functions to represent imprecise belief states has been advo-
cated by, among others, Good (1952), Levi (1974, 1986), Jeffrey (1992), Kaplan (1996), Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), Joyce (2011) and Nehring (2009).
5The incompatibility of these and other reasonable preferences with Bayesianism is at the
heart of the structurally similar Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961).
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available information (combined with the decision maker’s expertise and personal
judgement) provides little guidance, the “subjective” element may be rather hefty
indeed. This probability function determines, together with a utility function on
consequences, an expected utility for each action available to the decision-maker,
and the theory enjoins her to choose the action with greatest expected utility.
Despite the severity of uncertainty faced in the climate domain, Bayesian de-
cision theory has its adherents. John Broome, for instance, argues that in climate
policy decision making:
The lack of firm probabilities is not a reason to give up expected value
theory. You might despair and adopt some other way of coping with
uncertainty . . . That would be a mistake. Stick with expected value
theory, since it is very well founded, and do your best with probabilities
and values. (Broome, 2012, 129)
Paralleling the points made in the coin example above, critics of the Bayesian
view argue that the decision maker may be unable to supply the required precise
subjective probabilities, and that any “filling in” of the gap between probability
ranges and precise probabilities may prove too ad hoc to be a reasonable guide to
decision. Policy makers may quite reasonably refuse to base a policy decision on
a flimsy information base inflated with whatever guesses are required to adhere to
Bayesian tenets, especially when there is a lot at stake.
Imprecise probabilists, on the other hand, face the problem of spelling out how
a decision maker with a set of probability functions should choose. Her problem
can be put in the following way. Each probability function in her set determines,
together with a utility function on consequences, an expected utility for each avail-
able action; but except on rare occasions when one action dominates all others in
the sense that its expected utility is greatest relative to every admissible probabil-
ity function, this does not provide a sufficient basis for choice. Were the decision
maker to simply average the expected utilities associated with each action, her
decisions would then be indistinguishable from those of a Bayesian. There are,
however, other considerations that she can bring to bare on the problem which
will lead her to act in a way which cannot be given a Bayesian rationalisation. She
may wish, for instance, to act cautiously, by giving more weight to the ‘down-side’
risks (the possible negative consequences of an action) than the ‘up-side’ chances
or by preferring actions with a narrower spread of (expected) outcomes.
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A much-discussed decision rule encoding such caution is the maximin expected
utility rule (MMEU), which recommends picking the action with the greatest
minimum expected utility relative to the set of probabilities that the decision
maker is working with (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). To state the rule more
formally, let C = {p1, ..., pn} be a set of probability functions,6 and for any p ∈ C
and action f , let EUp(f) be the expected utility of f computed from p. The rule
then ascribes a value V to each action f in accordance with:
(MMEU) V (f) = minp∈C [EUp(f)]
MMEU is simple to use, but arguably too cautious, paying no attention at all
to the full spread of possible expected utilities. This shortcoming is mitigated in
some of the other rules for decision making that draw on imprecise probabilities,
such as maximizing a weighted average of the minimum and maximum expected
utility (often called the α-MEU rule), or the minimum and mean expected utility,
where the averaging weights can be thought of as reflecting either the decision
maker’s pessimism or their degree of caution (see for instance Binmore, 2008;
Ghirardato et al., 2004; Gilboa and Marinacci, 2011).
A question that all such rules must address is how to specify the set C of
probabilities on which they are based. Where evidence is sparse, the Bayesian
insistence on a single probability function seems too extreme. But if C contains
all probabilities logically consistent with the evidence, then the decision maker is
likely to end up with very wide probability intervals, which can in turn lead to
overly cautious decision-making. A natural thought is that C should determine
probability intervals only so broad as to ensure the decision-maker is confident
the “true” probabilities lie within them, or that they contain all reasonable values
(see, e.g., Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1982). The decision maker may, for instance,
wish to discard some implausible probability functions even though they are not,
strictly speaking, contradicted by the evidence. Or if the source of these prob-
abilities are the opinions of others, the decision maker need not consider every
opinion consistent with the evidence, but rather only those in which they have
some confidence. But how confident need they be? We return to this question
below, after discussing the notion of confidence in more detail.
6For simplicity we suppose a finite set, but it needn’t be so.
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3.2 Confidence
The decision rules canvassed above can make use of the probability ranges found in
IPCC reports, but not the confidence judgements that qualify them. Now we look
at some rules that can be construed as drawing on such judgements. According
to the authors of the IPCC guidance notes “A level of confidence provides a
qualitative synthesis of an author team’s judgment about the validity of a finding;
it integrates the evaluation of evidence and agreement in one metric” (Mastrandrea
et al., 2011, 679). Let’s address these two contributors to IPCC confidence in turn.
“Evaluation of evidence” depends on the amount, or weight, of the evidence
relevant to the judgement in question. Suppose for instance that a decision maker
is pressed to report a single number for the chance of heads on the next coin toss
in the two situations we described before, namely when she knows nothing about
the coin and when she has observed it being tossed many times. She may report
one-half in both cases, but is likely to have more confidence in that assessment
in the case where the judgement is based on abundant evidence (the previously
observed tosses) as opposed to the case where it is based on scant evidence. This
is because a larger body of evidence is likely to be reflected in a higher level of
confidence in the judgements that are based on it.
The second contributor to confidence is “agreement.” To tweak the coin ex-
ample, compare a situation in which a group of coin experts agrees that the prob-
ability of heads on the next toss is one half with a case where the same group is
evenly split between those that think the probability is zero and those that think
that it is one. Here too, a decision maker pressed to give a single number might
say one-half in both cases, but it seems reasonable to have more confidence in
the former case than in the latter. Holding the amount of evidence fixed, greater
agreement in the expert judgement based on it engenders greater confidence.
The two dimensions of IPCC confidence connect to largely distinct literatures.
The evidence dimension connects with that on the weight of evidence behind a
probability judgement and how this weight can be included in representations
of uncertainty. The agreement dimension connects with the literature on expert
testimony and aggregation of expert probability functions (for a survey, see Gen-
est and Zidek, 1986). Models employing confidence weights on different possible
probabilities are to be found in both literatures. In the first, the probabilities are
interpreted as different probabilistic hypotheses and the weights as measures of
the agent’s confidence in them. In the second, the probabilities are interpreted as
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the experts’ judgements and the weights as a measure of an agent’s confidence in
the experts. So while weight of evidence and expert agreement are two distinct
notions, they can be represented similarly, and play analogous roles in determin-
ing judgements and guiding action. It is thus not unreasonable to proceed in the
manner suggested by the IPCC and place both under a single notion of confidence.
What role should these second-order confidence weights play in decision mak-
ing? To the extent that different probability judgements support different assess-
ments of the expected benefit or utility of an action, one would expect the relative
confidence (or lack of it) that a decision maker might have in the former will trans-
fer to the latter. For instance when the probability estimates derive from different
models or experts, the decision maker may regard some models as better corrobo-
rated by evidence than others, or some experts as more reliable than others. It is
then reasonable, ceteris paribus, to favor actions with high expected benefit based
on the probabilities in which one has most confidence over actions whose case for
being beneficial depends on probabilities in which one has less confidence.
One way to do this is to use the confidence weights over probability measures to
weight the corresponding first-order expected utilities, determining what might be
called the confidence-weighted expected utility (CWEU) of an action. Formally,
let C = {p1, ..., pn} be a set of probability functions, and {αi} the corresponding
weights, normalised so that
∑
i αi = 1. Then:
(CWEU) V (f) =
∑
i
αi.EUpi(f)
Here the weights effectively induce a second-order probability over C, and max-
imizing CWEU is equivalent to maximizing the expected utility relative to the
“consensus” probability obtained by averaging the elements of C using this prob-
ability. But this seems unsatisfactory from a pragmatic point of view as it would
preclude a decision maker displaying the sort of caution, or aversion to uncertainty,
that we argued could be motivated in contexts like those exhibited by the coin ex-
ample. Given a choice between betting on one coin or the other, an agent following
CWEU cannot prefer betting on the coin for which she has more evidence. But
some degree of discrimination between high and low confidence situations does
seem appropriate for important policy decisions.
Other decision models proposed in the economics literature allow for this kind
of discrimination. The “smooth ambiguity” model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) is a
close variant of CWEU; it too uses second-order probability, but it allows for an
10
aversion to wide spreads of expected utilities by valuing an action f in terms of the
expectation (with respect to the second-order probability) of a transformation of
the EUpi(f), rather than the expected utilities themselves. Formally (and ignoring
technicalities due to integration rather than summation), the rule works as follows:
(KMM) V (f) =
∑
i
αi.φ(EUpi(f))
where φ is a transformation of expected utilities capturing the decision maker’s
attitudes to uncertainty (the decision maker displays aversion to uncertainty when-
ever φ is concave).
Other suggestions in this literature use general real-valued functions (rather
than probabilities) at the second-order level, and can be thought of as refinements
of the MMEU model discussed in the previous section. Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin
(1982), for instance, uses the weights to determine the set of probability functions
C = {p1, . . . , pn}, admitting only those that exceed some confidence threshold
and then apply MMEU to it; Maccheroni et al. (2006) value each action as the
minimum, across the set of probability functions C, of the sum of the action’s
expected utility given pi and the second-order weight given to pi; and Chateauneuf
and Faro (2009) take the minimum of confidence-weighted expected utilities over
probability functions whose second-order weight falls below a certain absolute
threshold.
From the perspective of this paper, all these proposals suffer from a fundamen-
tal limitation. Application of these rules requires a cardinal measure of confidence
to serve as the weights on probability measures. That is, the confidence numbers
matter: if not, it would make no sense to multiply or add them as is done in
these rules. By contrast, the IPCC provides only a qualitative, ordinal measure
of confidence: it can say whether there is more confidence or less, in one proba-
bility judgement compared to another, but not how much more or less.7 So the
aforementioned models of decision require more information than is available in
this context.
IPCC practice is not unreasonable in this respect. Indeed if the decision
maker has trouble forming precise first-order probabilities, why would he have
any less trouble forming precise second-order confidence weights? Such consider-
ations plead in favour of a more parsimonious representation of confidence, in line
7Moreover, IPCC confidence applies to probability claims, not to (fully-specified) probability
measures; it is not always straightforward to translate confidence in one to confidence in the
other.
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with the ordinal ranking used by the IPCC. To connect this to decision making,
however, a model is required that can work with ordinal confidence assessments
without requiring cardinality.
3.3 Hill’s Decision Model
In this last subsection we look at a decision model proposed by Brian Hill (2013)
which has a number of features that make it particularly suitable for our purposes.
Hill’s central insight is that the probability judgements we adopt can reasonably
vary with what is at stake in a decision. Consider, for instance, the schema for
decision problems represented by Table 1, in which the option Act has a low
probability of a very bad outcome (utility x 0) and a high probability of a good
outcome (utility y > 0). The table could represent a high stakes decision, such
as whether to build a nuclear plant near a town when there is a small imprecise
probability of an accident with catastrophic consequences. But it could equally
well represent a low stakes situation in which the agent is deciding whether to get
on the bus without a ticket when there is a small imprecise probability of being
caught.
prob.< 0.01 prob.≥ .99
Act x 0 y > 0
Don’t Act 0 0
Table 1: A small chance of a bad outcome.
Standard decision rules, such as expected utility maximisation or Maximin
EU, are invariant with respect to the scaling of the utility function. Consequently
they cannot treat a high stakes and a low stakes decision problem differently if
outcomes in the former are simply a “magnification” of those in the latter—for
instance if the nuclear accident was 100,000 times worse than being fined and the
benefits of nuclear energy 100,000 times better than those of travelling for free.
But it does not seem at all unreasonable to act more cautiously in high stakes
situations than low stakes ones.8
To accommodate this intuition, Hill allows for the set of probability measures
on which the decision is based to be shaped by how much is at stake in the
decision. This stakes-sensitivity is mediated by confidence: each decision situation
8More recent models also have trouble properly capturing this intuition (Hill, 2013, §1.2).
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will determine an appropriate confidence level for decision making based on what
is at stake in that decision. When the stakes are low the decision maker may not
need to have a great deal of confidence in a probability assessment in order to base
her decision upon it. When the stakes are high, however, the decision maker will
need a correspondingly high degree of confidence.
To formulate such a confidence-based decision rule, Hill draws on a purely
ordinal notion of confidence, requiring only that the set of probability measures
forms a nested family of sets centred on the measures that represent the decision
maker’s best-estimate probabilities. This structure is illustrated in Figure 1, where
each circle is a set of probability measures. The inner-most set is assigned the
lowest confidence level and each superset a higher confidence level than the one
it encloses. These confidence assignments can be thought of as expressing the
decision maker’s confidence that the “true” probability measure is contained in
that set. Probability statements that hold for every measure in a superset enjoy
greater confidence because the decision maker is more confident that the “true”
measure endorses the statement. As will be made clear below, the nested family
of sets of probability measures is ordinal at the second-order level in a way that
the representations discussed in the previous section are not. As such, it does not
suffer from the limitation that affects the latter.
If the stakes are:
then base decision on
this set of measures:
high
medium
low
Figure 1: How much is at stake in a decision determines the set of probability
measures that the decision rule can “see.”
For any given decision, the stakes determine the requisite level of confidence,
which in turn determines the set of probability measures taken as the basis for
choice: intuitively, the smallest set that enjoys the required level of confidence.
(Formally, Hill (2013) requires both a measure of the stakes associated with a
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decision problem and a cautiousness coefficient which maps stakes onto confidence
thresholds.) Once the set of measures has been picked out in this way, the decision
maker can make use of one of the rules for decision making under ambiguity
discussed earlier, such as MMEU or α-MEU. (Given that the set of measures used
depends on the decision maker’s confidence and the stakes involved in the decision,
this approach mitigates some of the shortcomings of these decision rules, such as
the extreme caution of MMEU discussed above.) In the special case that the set
picked out contains just one measure, ordinary expected utility maximisation is
applicable.
As should be evident, what Hill provides is a schema for confidence-based
decision rather than a specific model. Different notions of stakes and accounts of
cautiousness will determine different confidence levels. And there is the question of
which decision rule to apply in the final step. But these details are less important
than the fact that the schema can incorporate roughly the kind of information
that the IPCC provides. Spelling this out is our next task.
4 A Model of Confidence
Now we develop more formally the notion of confidence required to link IPCC
communications to the model of decision making just introduced. As is stan-
dard, actions or policies will be modelled as functions from states of the world to
outcomes, where outcomes are understood to pick out features of the world that
matter to the decision maker and which she seeks to promote or inhibit. States are
features of the world that, jointly with the actions, determine what outcome will
eventuate. What counts as an outcome or a state depends on the context: when
a decision concerns how to prepare for drought, for instance, mean temperatures
may serve as states, while in the context of climate change mitigation they may
serve as outcomes.
Central to our model is a distinction between two types of propositions that are
the objects of different kinds of uncertainty: propositions concerning “ordinary”
events, such as global mean surface temperature exceeding 21◦C in 2050, and
probability propositions such as there being a 50% chance that temperature will
exceed 21◦C in 2050. Intuitively the probability propositions represent possible
judgements yielded by scientific models or by experts and, hence, are propositions
in which the decision maker can have more or less confidence.
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Let S = {s1, s2, ..., sn} be a set of n states of the world and Ω = {A,B,C, ...}
be a Boolean algebra of sets of such states, called events or factual propositions.
Let Π = {pi} be the set of all possible probability functions on Ω, and ∆(Π)
be the set of all subsets of Π.9 Members of ∆(Π) play a dual role: as both the
possible imprecise belief states of the agent and as probability propositions, i.e.,
propositions about the probability of truth of the factual propositions in Ω. For
instance, if X is the proposition that it will rain tomorrow, then the proposition
that the probability of X is between one-half and three-quarters is given by the set
of probability distributions p such that 0.5 ≥ p(X) ≥ 0.75. So the probabilistic
statements that are qualified by confidence assessments in the IPCC examples
given in Section 2 correspond to elements of ∆(Π).
To represent the confidence assessments appearing in IPCC reports we intro-
duce a weak pre-order, D, on ∆(Π), i.e., a reflexive and transitive binary relation
on sets of probability measures. Intuitively D captures the relative confidence
that a group of IPCC authors has in the various probability propositions about
the state of the world, with P1 D P2 meaning that they are at least as confident in
the probability proposition expressed by P1 as that expressed by P2, as would be
the case if they gave P2 a medium confidence assessment and P1 high confidence.
In practice, a confidence relation drawn from IPCC reports will have up to five
levels, corresponding to the five qualifiers in their confidence language (Section
2). It is reasonable to assume that D is non-trivial (that Π B ∅) and mono-
tonic with respect to logical implication between probability propositions (i.e.,
that P1 D P2 whenever P2 ⊆ P1), because one should have more confidence in less
precise propositions.
We do not, however, assume that D is complete. But note that completeness
can fail to hold for two different reasons. First, there may be issues represented in
the state space about which the agent makes no confidence judgements. For exam-
ple, the IPCC does not assess the chance of rain in London next week. Second, the
agent may make a confidence judgement about a certain probability proposition,
but no judgments about other probability propositions concerning the same issue.
For example the IPCC may report medium confidence that a certain occurrence
is likely (66–100% chance), but say nothing about how confident one should be
that the same occurrence is more likely than not (50–100% chance).
9Although the state space (and other technical notions discussed here) may be infinite—and
indeed have measure-theoretic or topological structure—we abstract from such technicalities here
and conduct the discussion as if everything were finite.
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To see how to translate this into the terms of Hill’s decision model, let us
first reformulate the model. Hill’s model of confidence effectively consists of a
chain of probability propositions, {L0, L1, . . . , Ln} with Li ⊂ Li+1. L0 is the most
precise probability proposition that the agent accepts; it summarizes her beliefs
in the sense that every probability proposition that she accepts (with sufficient
confidence) is implied by every probability function in L0. The other Li are pro-
gressively less precise probability propositions held with progressively greater con-
fidence. The chain {L0, L1, . . . , Ln} is equivalent to what we shall call a confidence
partition: an ordered partition of the space Π of probability measures. Any nested
family of probabilities {L0, ..., Ln} induces a confidence partition {P0, ..., Pn} where
L0 = P0 and Pi = Li − Li−1. Pi (for i > 0) contains those probability measures
that the agent rules out as contenders for the “true” measures at the confidence
level i − 1 but not at the higher confidence level i. Inversely, any confidence
partition pi = {P0, ..., Pn} induces a nested family of sets of probability measures
{L0, ..., Ln} such that L0 = P0 and Li = P0∪...∪Pi. A sample confidence partition
and corresponding nested family are given in Figure 2, for the issue of the weather
tomorrow. P0, the agent’s best-estimate probability range for rain, is the propo-
sition that the probability of rain tomorrow is between 0.4 and 0.6, P1 that it is
either between 0.3 and 0.4 or between 0.6 and 0.7, P2 that it is between 0.1 and 0.3
or 0.7 and 0.9, and P3 the remaining probabilities. As is generally the case with
the Hill model, the agent is represented by this figure as having made confidence
judgements regarding any pair of these probability propositions for rain.
Figure 2: A confidence partition for the proposition that it will rain tomor-
row. Bracketed intervals show probabilities given by the probability propositions.
Nested sets L0, L1, L3 can be constructed from the partition P0, . . . , P3. The over-
all ordering is: L2 D L1 D L0 ≡ P0 D P1 D P2 D P3.
P3
P2
P1
P0
[.4− .6]
[.3− .4), (.6− .7]
[.1− .3), (.7− .9]
[0− .1), (.9− 1]
L0 [.4− .6]
L1 [.3− .7]
L2 [.1− .9]
Which chain of probability propositions (or, equivalently, which confidence
partition) does an IPCC-style assessment recommend for decision purposes? The
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probability measures in the lowest element of the partition are those that satisfy
all of the probability propositions, on a given issue, that are affirmed by the IPCC
(with any confidence level). The additional measures to be considered as con-
tenders at the next level up, P1, need only satisfy those probability propositions
affirmed by the IPCC with this next-level-up (or higher) level of confidence. Ad-
ditional probability measures collected in P2 should satisfy the IPCC probability
propositions that are on or above the next level up, and so on. Only confidence
partitions satisfying these conditions faithfully capture the IPCC confidence and
probability assessments.
Note that this protocol picks a unique confidence partition only in the case
where the confidence relation D is complete. Otherwise, several confidence par-
titions will be consistent with the confidence relation; as noted above, this will
generally be the case for IPCC assessments. Since each confidence partition corre-
sponds to a unique complete confidence relation, the use of a particular partition
essentially amounts to “filling in” confidence assessments that were not provided.
To relate this model of confidence to the preceding discussion, if the partition
has just two members, then in effect the relation D divides Π into those measures
in which the agent has sufficient confidence to take as a basis for choice and those in
which she does not. In this case our model reduces to the single set of probability
measures on which the MMEU rule and related decision criteria are based. And if,
furthermore, this sufficient-confidence set contains only one probability measure,
then we are returned to the standard Bayesian framework. Hence these models
are special cases of Hill’s, corresponding to a nested family containing a single set
(which, in the Bayesian case, is a singleton).
And while a confidence partition does induce a confidence measure on its
elements—constructed by assigning numbers to the partition members in accor-
dance with the confidence ranking—this measure is purely ordinal and carries no
more information than the qualitative confidence categories (“low,” “medium,”
“high”) that qualify IPCC probability judgements. An ordinal measure of confi-
dence is all that is required to apply Hill’s model. In contrast, the decision models
discussed in Section 3.2 require a cardinal measure on every probability function
in Π, something that cannot be extracted from the confidence relation D unless it
has further properties beyond those assumed here.
Next we illustrate the confidence partition concept by applying it to a concrete
example from the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).
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4.1 An Example
Equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS) is often used as a single-number proxy for
the overall behavior of the climate system in response to increasing greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The greater the value, the greater the
tendency to warm in response to greenhouse gasses. The quantity is defined by
a hypothetical global experiment: start with the pre-industrial atmosphere and
instantaneously double the concentration of carbon dioxide; now sit back and
allow the system to reach its new equilibrium (this would take hundreds of years).
ECS is the difference between the annual global mean surface temperature of the
pre-industrial world and that of the new equilibrium world. In short, it answers
the question: How much does the world warm if we double CO2?
The most recent IPCC findings on ECS draw on several chapters of the Work-
ing Group One contribution to the AR5. Estimates of ECS are based on statistical
analyses of the warming observed so far, similar analyses using simple to interme-
diate complexity climate models, reconstructions of climate change in the distant
past (paleoclimate), as well as the behavior of the most complex, supercomputer-
driven climate models used in the last two phases of the colossal Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project (CMIP3 and CMIP5). An expert author team reviewed
all of this research, weighing its strengths, weaknesses, and uncertainties, and
came to the following collective judgements. With high confidence, ECS is likely
in the range 1.5◦C to 4.5◦C and extremely unlikely less than 1◦C. With medium
confidence it is very unlikely greater than 6◦C (Stocker et al., 2013, 81).
In light of the confidence model discussed above, reports of this kind can be
understood in terms of a confidence partition over probability density functions
(pdfs). Beginning from all possible pdfs on the real line—each one expressing a
(precise) probability claim about ECS—think of what the author team is doing,
as they evaluate and debate the evidence, as sorting those pdfs into a partition
pi = {P0, ..., Pn}. The findings cited above then communicate aspects of this
confidence partition. To illustrate, we present a toy partition that exemplifies the
IPCC’s findings on ECS.
Suppose the confidence partition has four elements pi = {P0, ..., P3}. Figure 3
displays the pdfs in the first two elements of the partition. The functions plotted
in black are those from P0; collectively, these functions indicate what the IPCC’s
experts regard as a plausible range of probabilities for ECS in light of the available
evidence. The pdfs in P1 collectively represent a second tier of plausibility; these
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are plotted in grey. P2 is another step down from there, and P3 is the bottom of
the barrel—all of the pdfs more or less ruled out by the body of research that the
experts evaluated. (P2 and P3 are not represented in Figure 3.)
Recall that the partition pi generates a nested family of subsets {L1..., Ln},
where Li is the union of P0 through Pi and each L is associated with a level of
confidence. Here we are concerned mainly with L0 = P0 and L1 = P0 ∪ P1, and
we suppose in this case that L0 corresponds to medium confidence, and L1 to high
confidence. To see how an IPCC-style finding follows from the confidence parti-
tion, consider what our partition says about ECS values above 6◦. If we restrict
attention to L0, there are only two pdfs to examine; one assigns (nearly) zero
probability to values above 6◦ while the other assigns just under 0.1 probability
(the shaded area in Figure 3). In the IPCC’s calibrated language, the probability
range 0− 0.1 is called very unlikely, thus the finding: ECS is very unlikely greater
than 6◦C (medium confidence).
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Figure 3: An illustration of a confidence partition that is consistent with the IPCC
findings on Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity. The shaded area corresponds to the
finding that ECS is very unlikely greater than 6◦C (medium confidence).
The IPCC’s two other findings on ECS are reflected in our partition as follows.
Reporting with high confidence means broadening our view from L0 to L1, taking
the P1 pdfs into account in addition to those in P0. The interval 1.5 − 4.5 is
indicated in Figure 3 with dotted vertical lines. The smallest probability given
to that interval by any of the functions pictured is a little more than 0.6, and
the highest probability is nearly 1, an interval that corresponds roughly with the
meaning of likely (0.66−1). Regarding ECS values below 1, several pdfs give that
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region zero probability, while the most left-leaning of them gives it 0.05. The range
0 − 0.05 is called extremely unlikely. Thus we have: ECS is likely in the range
1.5◦C to 4.5◦C and extremely unlikely less than 1◦C (both with high confidence).
The three findings discussed above are far from the only ones that follow from
the example partition. To report again on ECS values above 6◦C, only now with
high confidence rather than medium, the probability interval should be expanded
from 0−0.1 to 0−0.2 (0.2 being the area to the right of 6◦ under the fattest-tailed of
the P1 pdfs). Or to report on values below 1
◦C with medium confidence rather than
high, the probability interval should be shrunk from 0−0.5 to 0−0.01 (exceptionally
unlikely). The confidence partition determines an imprecise probability at medium
confidence, and another at high confidence, for any interval of values for ECS.
It should be emphasized that these additional findings do not follow from the
three that the IPCC in fact published. They follow from this particular confidence
partition, which is constrained—though not fully determined—by the IPCC’s pub-
lished findings. Asking what could be reported about ECS at very high confidence
further highlights the limits of what the IPCC has conveyed. Suppose the set L2
corresponds to very high confidence. As the IPCC has said nothing with very high
confidence, we have no information about the pdfs that should go into P2, and
thus L2, so we have no indication of how much the reported probability ranges
should be expanded in order to claim very high confidence. This may be because
in the confidence partition representation of the experts’ group beliefs, P2 is a
sprawling menagerie of pdfs. In this case probabilities at the very high confidence
level would be so imprecise as to appear uninformative. On the other hand, it
may sometimes be of interest to policymakers just how much (or how little) can
be said at the very high confidence level.
5 Discussion
We began by highlighting an important subset of IPCC findings in which uncer-
tainty is expressed using imprecise probability qualified by confidence. We asked
how scientific knowledge coded in this format might be used within a normative
model of decision making. We surveyed work in decision theory that makes room
for something like the IPCC’s confidence qualifications and found the family of
models in Hill (2013), which have been defended as normatively reasonable on
independent grounds, to be the most promising. We now treat some possible
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objections, identify open questions and challenges, and point out some potential
consequences of this decision-theoretic take on IPCC assessments.
Our model should be understood as illustrating how, in principle, such find-
ings can be used in decision making. It provides a disciplining structure for the
uncertainty expressed in IPCC findings—structure that is a prerequisite for the
use of such findings within a normative decision model. (As noted above, there
remains a gap between IPCC findings and the decision model in so far as the
model involves a full confidence partition whereas the statements provided by the
IPCC constrain but do not fully determine one.) Our model sketches one way in
which such findings can be harnessed to provide concrete decision support, but
other procedures for generating confidence partitions, or even for using the partial
information without introducing new structure, deserve exploration.
This is particularly so since our model has implications for judgements of joint
probability and confidence that some may find implausible. Suppose that two
IPCC author groups respectively report with high confidence that low rainfall
is likely and that low temperature is likely. What can be inferred about the
prospect of both low rainfall and low temperature? This question turns on at
least three issues. The first is the standard issue of joint probabilities. As is well
known, one cannot conclude from these probability assessments that low rainfall
and temperature is likely. And indeed, under the model set out in Section 4,
nothing more than what follows from the individual probability propositions is
assumed about the joint probability.
The second is the issue of “joint confidence.” The nested sets representation
of confidence employed in Hill’s model implies that if both “low rainfall is likely”
and “low temperature is likely” are held with high confidence, then their con-
junction “low rainfall is likely and low temperature is likely” must be held with
high confidence as well. This follows from the fact that a proposition is held with
high confidence if it is supported by every probability function contained in the
high-confidence set. On the other hand, it does not follow that the proposition
“A combination of low rainfall and low temperature is likely” is held with high
confidence since the high probability of this combination does not follow from high
probability of its elements.
The third issue involves the calibration of confidence levels between groups.
How do we know that what one group means by “high confidence” is the same as
the other (and, indeed, that they mean the same thing to the policy maker using
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their findings)? A proper calibration scale—analogous to the 0–1 scale for prob-
abilities, or the standard meter in Paris—would enable clear and unambiguous
formulation and communication of confidence judgements across authors and ac-
tors. Were one to take our proposal for connecting the IPCC uncertainty language
with theories of decision seriously, one major challenge is to develop such a scale.
This development would likely go hand-in-hand with elicitation mechanisms—
modelled on those used in behavioural economics, perhaps, or in structured expert
elicitation—that would allow IPCC authors to reveal and express their confidence
in probability assessments.
Turning now to the use of the confidence partition in decision making, the Hill
(2013) family of models gives confidence a role in guiding decision makers to the
set of probability measures that is right for them in a given context. The decision
maker’s utilities determine the stakes, and their cautiousness coefficient maps the
stakes to a level of confidence and thus to the set of probability measures that their
decision rule will take into account in evaluating actions. IPCC findings inform
the confidence element of Hill’s model, but they deliver neither a measure of the
stakes associated with a decision problem nor a cautiousness coefficient. Where an
individual acts alone, the stakes are determined by her preferences (or her utility
function) while the cautiousness coefficient reflects some feature of her attitudes to
uncertainty. In the case of climate policy decisions, things are analogous but more
complicated. Putting utilities on outcomes and fixing the level of cautiousness
are difficult tasks, insofar as both should reflect the interests and attitudes of
individuals living in different places and at different times. That IPCC findings
(at least those addressing the physical science basis of climate change) do not
provide these elements is as it should be: this is not a “fact” dimension, on which
climate scientists have expertise, but a “value” dimension, which derives from the
stakeholders to the decision.
This fact-value distinction (or belief-taste distinction in economics) is muddied
by many of the decision models surveyed above; it is known, for instance, that
the MMEU decision model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), as well as those of
Maccheroni et al. (2006) and Chateauneuf and Faro (2009), do not permit a clean
separation of beliefs from tastes. In the case of MMEU for example, the set
of probability functions captures both the beliefs or information at the decision
maker’s disposal, but also his taste for choosing in the face of uncertainty: using a
smaller range of probabilities can be interpreted as having a less cautious attitude
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towards one’s ignorance. Such models are less suitable in a policy decision context
where scientists’ input should in principle be restricted to the domain of facts (and
uncertainty about them), and a values element should not automatically be read
into that input.
By contrast, as argued in Hill (2013), the decision model employed here does
support a clean fact-value distinction. Confidence is exclusively a belief aspect,
whereas the cautiousness coefficient is a taste factor. So the encroachment of value
judgements into scientific reporting is not, at least, a theoretical consequence of
the model. (And, indeed, with appropriate calibration of the sort described above,
it may even be possible to largely avoid it in practice; though see Steele (2012) on
the difficulty of doing so.)
This normatively attractive property of the model is relatively rare: indeed, it
is one of two non-Bayesian models that supports a neat belief-taste distinction that
we have been able to find in the literature. The other one is the smooth ambiguity
model mentioned in Section 3.2, which uses second-order probabilities, and hence
requires cardinal confidence assessments. So Hill’s model seems to be the only
available decision-theoretically solid representation that can capture the role of
uncertainty about probability judgement without demanding value judgements
from scientists or cardinal second-order confidence assessments. As such, our
investigation provides a perhaps unexpected vindication of IPCC practice via the
affinity between their uncertainty guidance and one of the only decision models
that seems suitable for the climate policy decisions they aim to inform.
5.1 Recommendations
Our discussion of the IPCC’s uncertainty framework and the relevant policy deci-
sion requirements allows us to make several tentative recommendations.
In the climate sensitivity example above, we saw multiple statements address-
ing different possible value ranges (left tail, middle, right tail) of the same un-
certain quantity, using different levels of confidence. But what we do not see in
this example, nor have we found elsewhere, is multiple statements, at different
confidence levels, concerning the same range of the uncertain quantity. That is,
we do not see pairs of claims such as: the chance that ECS is greater than 6◦ is,
with medium confidence, less than 10%, and with high confidence less than 20%.
The confidence partition formalism shows how it can make sense, conceptually, to
answer the same question at multiple confidence levels. Doing so gives a richer
23
picture of scientific knowledge, and the added information may be valuable to
policy makers and to the public. There is no basis for the current (unwritten)
convention of reporting only a single confidence level; a richer reporting practice
is possible, and appears desirable.
Given the possibility of reporting at more than one level of confidence, in
choosing just one, IPCC authors are implicitly managing a trade-off between the
size of a probability interval and the level of confidence (e.g., likely (.66− 1) with
medium confidence, versus more likely than not (.5 − 1) with high confidence).
Yet the uncertainty guidance notes offer no advice to authors on managing this
trade-off.10 Moreover, in light of the decision model developed above, there is an
aspect to this choice that falls on the value side of the fact-value divide. While
in practice IPCC authors may select on epistemic grounds (where they can make
the most informative statements), the choice may be understood as involving a
value judgement, since it may appear to suggest which set of probability measures
the reader should use in their decision problem. Normally it is the agent’s utili-
ties and cautiousness that together pick out the appropriate set from the nested
family of probability measures. So not only is reporting at multiple confidence
levels conceptually sensible, but it may be desirable in order simultaneously to
give relevant information to different users who will determine for themselves the
level of confidence at which they require probabilistic information to inform their
decisions.
Naturally, it is impractical to demand that IPCC reports provide assessments
at every confidence level on every issue that they treat probabilistically. But
a feasible step in that direction might be to encourage reporting at more than
one level, where the evidence allows, and when the results would be informative.
The value-judgment aspect of confidence suggests a second step. The choice of
confidence level(s) at which IPCC authors assess probability would ideally be in-
formed in some way by the public or its representatives, suggesting that policy
makers should be involved at the beginning of the IPCC process, to provide input
regarding the confidence level(s) at which scientific assessments would be most
decision-relevant. Communication of the relevant confidence level between policy
makers and climate scientists would rely on and be formulated in terms of the
sort of calibration scale discussed above. There are, of course, many decisions to
10The AR4 guidance note included the advice to “Avoid trivializing statements just to increase
their confidence” (Manning, 2005, 1). Note, however, that the meaning of “confidence” changed
between AR4 and AR5.
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be taken, with different stakes and stakeholders: mitigation decisions and adap-
tation decisions, public and private, global, regional, and local. The envisioned
policy maker and stakeholder input would presumably indicate varying levels of
confidence for key findings across IPCC chapters and working groups.
The realm of recommendations and possibilities goes well beyond those ex-
plored here. Our aim is simply to suggest some ideas for guiding practice on the
basis of how IPCC assessments can be used in decision and policy making and,
more importantly, to open a discussion on the issue.
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